AM Notes: China Spotlight

Market sentiment remains underpinned, although U.S. futures are slightly red in overnight trade...

Much like China's data dump overnight there isn't much to read into it...

  • Chinese GDP (Q1) Q/Q 0.6% vs. Exp. 1.5% (Prev. 2.6%)

  • Chinese GDP (Q1) Y/Y 18.3% vs. Exp. 19.0% (Prev. 6.5%)

  • Chinese Industrial Production (Mar) Y/Y 14.1% vs. Exp. 17.2% (Prev. 35.1%)

  • Chinese Retail Sales (Mar) Y/Y 34.2% vs. Exp. 28.0% (Prev. 33.8%)

  • Chinese House Prices (Mar) Y/Y 4.6% (Prev. 4.3%)

(ING) The high GDP growth in 1Q21 will not persist over the rest of the year.

Most quarters should experience moderate growth because without base effects to swell the comparison, “super-high” growth will be very hard to repeat.

Quarter on quarter growth rates should continue to stabilise between 1% to 2%.

Domestic consumption will continue to be the stabiliser of the economy, and digital infrastructure investment will be the backbone of future growth.

China-US relations will be critical for China's economic growth, mostly in technology development.

It is likely that the US will continue to put more pressure on China on this topic.

Concern about chip shortages is becoming a practical issue for businesses, from investment to production to exports and domestic sales.

How long this bottleneck will take to clear is unclear.

We don't think there will be any tightening of monetary policy.

The central government has restarted deleveraging reform focusing on the weak cash flow of real estate property developers.

So, there is room for a relaxation of monetary policy.

Moreover, as the economy is recovering, too relaxed a monetary policy stance could induce asset bubbles rather than boosting investment in the real economy.

The government cannot reign in house price growth...

Last 5 years YoY data

Average new home prices in China's 70 major cities rose by 4.6 percent year-on-year in March 2021, accelerating from a 4.3 percent rise in the previous month. This was the steepest pace of growth in new home prices since September last year, as government cooling measures were largely offset by strong demand for property in some major cities.

On a monthly basis, new home prices went up by 0.5 percent in March, the most in seven months, after a 0.4 percent gain in February.

One to watch as they attempt to crack down on property speculation...

ICYMI:

The entire Chinese deleveraging is intriguing and this Huarong situation is grabbing headlines too...

They are the highest profile state owned enterprise (majority owned by China's ministry of finance) in this situation to date, and there is speculation surrounding the potential for contagion...

Ratings agencies are on the ball as usual...

Moody's Investors Service and Fitch Ratings on Tuesday announced that they will review their ratings of China Huarong for a possible downgrade.

S&P Global Ratings made a similar statement last week.

All three agencies rate it as investment grade now.

Default?

Not necessarily...

Gavekal analysts Wei He and Xiaoxi Zhang point to Baoshang’s experience, when the People’s Bank of China imposed an average haircut on large institutional investors of about 10%.

To remind institutional investors that offshore bonds don’t have a formal backstop, international investors may be required to bear a somewhat bigger loss, though not so big that it inflicts longer term damage to investor confidence, the Gavekal analysts write.

Nomura's Yap believes there is 10% chance of authorities opting to "teach investors a lesson for enabling the previous chairman's bad behavior," by imposing a 30% haircut on these offshore bonds.

However, his base-case scenario remains that the offshore obligations will be honored.

The CCP are caught in their own finger trap - the implicit guarantees are necessary to attract foreign investment, but deleveraging is perhaps a higher priority...

The issue is not exclusive to Huarong as Bloomberg note 👇

In 2020, the volume of China's bonds issued overseas in foreign currencies reached $220.4 billion, according to data from Citi, Bloomberg and Dealogic.

13 Chinese companies defaulted on bonds in the offshore markets, worth a combined $8.2 billion, or 0.9% of the outstanding amount of the country's total offshore bonds, worth $909.3 billion at the time...

In 2021, overall defaults are up drastically...

'Only' $3.7 billion of the defaults were in offshore bonds, so the assumption that risks can be contained and managed looks set to continue for now...

One problem with assumptions surrounding policy...

“If you decide to exit such a policy, you have to take the markets by surprise,”

For now, China is trying to manage bankruptcies and defaults...

What if the market begins to lose confidence in their ability to do so?

How would they respond...?

“An accidental break of the floor would have been more serious for SNB credibility,”

đź’ˇ What is more important to the CCP if it comes to the crunch...

Maintaining domestic credibility in pursuing policy goals or temporarily sacrificing overseas investor confidence?